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SOCIOLOGICAL ORIGINS
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Volume 3, No. 2, Spring 2005
THE 2003 IOWA SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Sociological Thought Experiments: Five Examples from the History of
Sociology1
Michael R. Hill
INTRODUCTION
Iam honored to speak with you today about several topics close to my professional andpersonal heart.  I say personal as well as professional because for some twenty years nowmy interest in the history of sociology has developed and deepened in tandem with the
pioneering research conducted by my life-partner, Mary Jo Deegan.  Her work on Jane Addams
and the Men of the Chicago School, 1892-1918 (Deegan 1988a) has become the paradigm
example for the “new history” in sociology, and it is my inspiration for today’s discussion.
My topic today is “Sociological Thought Experiments.” I will briefly introduce you
to five exemplars drawn from the history of sociology, and conclude with my own example that
asks, “What if the values and principles of Harriet Martineau, the first woman sociologist (Hill
1991; Hoecker-Drysdale 1992; Hill and Hoecker-Drysdale 2001), were applied to sociology
today and tomorrow?” That is to say, I hope to show that in seeking “alternative futures” for
the discipline of sociology, there is a nice role for “thought experiments” to play in linking our
disciplinary history to our disciplinary future.  First, however, I must note the history of
“thought experiments” in physics and philosophy, and outline a few pertinent conceptual issues
that have been illuminated by the work of the late American sociologist, Erving Goffman.
2 We could easily (and profitably) begin such a digression, for example, by exploring George
Herbert Mead’s (1899) inherently experimental approach to social reform, and thence to the
necessarily provisional character of all sociological theories.
3 From the German, Gedanken  =  “to think.”
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WHAT IS A “THOUGHT EXPERIMENT”?
First, let us ask, “What is a thought experiment?  But, let’s be careful. This sort of
question—together with the potential extensions and variations—can keep professional
philosophers employed by the dozens for years at a time (see, for examples, the selected
citations in the list of references, below):  “What does it mean to think about a thought
experiment?” “Are all thoughts experiments of a similar sort?” “When is a thought not an
experiment?” “What is experimental thinking?” “Is it an experiment to ask if a thought is an
experiment?” etc., etc.  My tactic today is to avoid such philosophical play, enticing though it
is, by simply ignoring it. This will not do intellectually in the long run, of course, but as a
practical stratagem it keeps my discussion within the allotted time.2  
In 1987, when I first wrote about thought experiments, in an article published in
Teaching Sociology (Hill 1987), it was generally agreed that the initial discussion of
Gedankenexperiment appeared in an essay written by the German physicist, Ernst Mach, in
1897.3  Mach (1897/1973: 451) wrote that conducting thought experiments involves a
researcher who “conceives circumstances and associates with these the idea, expectation, or
supposition of certain results.”  Mach concluded that experimental exercises in the mind are
“on a higher intellectual level” than actual physical experiments.  He also noted the fiscal and
practical economy of thought experiments.  Further, said Mach, the question-and-answer
exchanges generated by proposing and discussing thought experiments gave him an
outstanding way to assess his students’ intellectual capabilities.
In the nine decades since Mach wrote about Gedankenexperiment, some philosophers
now argue that “thought experiments,” as a set of methodological procedures, comprise a
“family,” some members of which bear little resemblance to each other (Cole 1984).  But, for
our purposes today, Tamar Gendler’s (2000: 34) recent general characterization sets the tone
I want to strike:
To draw a conclusion on the basis of a thought experiment is to
make a judgment about what would happen if the particular state of affairs
described in some imaginary scenario were actually to obtain.
I also continue to like what I wrote in 1987 regarding the application of thought experiments
to sociology, that is: I advocate thought experiments that (a) involve the disciplined exploration
of emancipatory alternative futures (the latter term is Anthony Giddens’) and that (b) attempt
to explicate the transformational routes between existing social patterns and desired social
structures (Hill 1987: 39).
5For the sake of an accurate record, however, it turns out that Ernst Mach was not the
first to use the term Gedankenexperiment.  That honor currently rests with Hans Christian
Örsted, a Danish philosopher and chemist, who used the term in 1811 in a work ponderously
titled:  Prolegomenon to the General Theory of Nature (Witt-Hansen 1976).
Before leaving physics and physicists to the side, I must observe that “thought
experiments” have proved useful in physics and that Albert Einstein was a noted practitioner.
His “moving trains” conjecture is considered a philosophical paradigm example of a “thought
experiment” (Gendler 2000: 19).  Einstein:
. . . asks us to imagine a situation in which there are two groups of people:
one group assembled at a certain point along the embankment of a railroad
track, and the other group riding on a train that is moving with respect to the
embankment.  Suppose that lightening strikes the embankment “at two
places A and B far distant from each other” such that those standing on the
embankment stand at a point exactly between them.  Suppose further that
from the perspective of the people standing at that point, the flashes occur
simultaneously.  Does it make sense to say that the flashes occurred
simultaneously?  (Gendler 2000: 29).
Einstein’s simple answer is “No”— and we can happily leave it there to move on to matters
more directly sociological. 
SOCIOLOGICAL PARALLELS AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES: ERVING GOFFMAN
Physics aside, there are several issues related to “thought experiments” that
sociologists can and should feel right at home with.  Most of these concerns have been nicely
itemized and detailed by the late American sociologist Erving Goffman (1974) in his
penultimate book, Frame Analysis.    Frame Analysis, in my judgement, is one of the most
potentially important—and most overlooked—books written by a twentieth-century sociologist.
It is not a perfect book, but it does many things well, including the insightful specification of
many types of what Goffman (1974: 40-82) calls “keys.”
Keys, in Goffman’s technical terminology, are identifiable forms into which some
action that is defined as real, and therefore potentially dangerous, can be rendered harmless
for various purposes.  Take, for example, the detonation of an atomic device or a deadly
biological weapon—these are very real, very harmful things (Hill 1988).  Goffman
demonstrates that we are capable of applying several types of keys to such events, including
turning the reality of a potential nuclear detonation into a:
Daydream or fanciful conjecture—in which, for example, we blow up our horrible
neighbors, but only in our mind’s eye.
Unscripted play—as when children, especially young boys, play at lethal matters,
such as “war” or “cops and robbers.”
6Scripted doing—such as a doomsday movie script or  theatrical play that “isn’t real.”
Rehearsals and practicing—in which we go through the motions, but don’t hurt
anyone, stopping short of lethal action.
Such keys are all parallels to “thought experiments,” especially where, for example, in the case
of large-scale social programs, the carrying out of the actual program on real people might
result in harm to the society in the long run.  For instance, if someone proposed the automatic
sterilization of everyone with an IQ below 100, I hope we would not want to just “try it out”
to see what happens.  Rather, by thinking of such programs as “thought experiments” we are
invited to “key” reality in various controlled and formulaic ways to try to estimate the possible
outcomes and consequences of any proposed social program.
We must never forget that thinking is a fundamental and guiding principle for all
meaningful sociological research.    C. Wright Mills (1956: 362) pointedly reminded us that
“Our desire for tight proof and our genuine need for facts do not at all mean that reasoning
together is not still a very important part of the proper way of arriving at the truth.”  Learning
to think and reason outside the bounds of large, readily available “data sets” requires making
robust commitments to study the whole of society, not just its overtly accessible parts.  Mills
(1956: 362) observed further:
Neither the very top nor the very bottom of modern society is a
normal part of the world of those who read and write books; we are more
familiar with the middle ranks.  To understand the middle classes we have
only to see what is actually around us, but to understand the very top or the
very bottom, we must first seek to discover and describe.  And that is very
difficult to do: the very top of modern society is often inaccessible, the very
bottom often hidden.  
The terms of such national surveys as are undertaken are far too
gross to catch such numerically fine groups as make up the American elite;
much public information about their character and their activities is
systematically misleading; and they are themselves busy and aloof and even
secretive.  Were we to select our field of study according to the ready
availability of much unworked material, we should never choose the elite.
And yet, if we are trying to understand something of the true nature of the
society in which we live, we cannot allow the impossibility of rigorous proof
to keep us from studying whatever we believe to be important.  We must
expect fumbles when, without authority or official aid, we set out to
investigate something which is in part organized for the purpose of causing
fumbles among those who would understand it plainly.  Yet, by asserting
what we can under such conditions, we may engage them and their agents
in controversy, and thus learn more.
For sociologists, thought experiments provide a crucially important tool for conceptualizing
investigations of the many substantive parts of society that are “often inaccessible,” to use
4 “Fabrications”—the outright organization of the world for purposes of deception—are more
fully explored in Erving Goffman’s Frame Analysis.
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Mills’ felicitous term.  For those of you who want, as Mills put it, “to understand something
of the true nature of the society in which we live,” then you must, from time to time, put aside
large, abstracted “data sets” that may indeed be “systematically misleading” or—worse—
specifically “organized for the purpose of causing fumbles among those who would understand
[society] plainly.”4  Mills (1956: 364) usefully concluded, “We do not want to so busy
ourselves with details that we take the world in which they exist for granted.”  Indeed, what if
the world and its large, readily available data sets are expressly organized to deceive and
obfuscate the actual state of things?  What if institutional review boards, for example, are
effectively—possibly nefariously—designed to keep us from learning anything sociologically
damning about powerful elites, in general, or about high-ranking university officials, in
particular?  What if we undertake research projects on elites “without authority or official aid?”
What consequences might befall us?   Such questions are the very stuff of thought experiments;
they help us avoid the methodological traps of mistakenly taking our sociological world for
granted.
When I first wrote about thought experiments in 1987, I did not at the time, and only
recently fully realized, that a mini-explosion in philosophical work on thought experiments was
about to occur.  A lot of sophisticated work has since been done in cognate fields (see
references section, below, and—especially—the bibliographies in Nersessian 1993, and
Gendler 2000: 161-250). It is now time for sociologists to play catch-up.   Goffman, in giving
us a clearer understanding of the nature and fine tuning of various “keys,” as tools in our
fundamental human conceptual apparatus, opens the way, in my view, for us as sociologists to
begin thinking much more seriously about how to better design thought experiments in the
social sciences—but following that road today would take us far from my assigned focus:  the
history of sociology.
THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS IN SOCIOLOGY: FIVE EXAMPLES
What intrigues me, as a student of the history of sociology, is the realization that
several major sociologists—although largely unsung within the discipline as a whole—have
usefully employed “thought experiments” in one guise or another throughout the early history
of our discipline.  It’s not a new idea in physics, and it’s not a new idea in sociology.  Today,
in quick order, I will present five historical examples.  Each person noted below was a prolific
author, and bibliographies of their individual writings are books in themselves.  Please
understand that in each case I provide only the briefest of introductions to the sociologists in
question.
Harriet Martineau — Illustrations of Political Economy (1832-1834)
Harriet Martineau, the first woman sociologist, was born in England in 1802 and died
in 1876 (Hill 1991).  She is best known for her major observational study of American life:
8Society in America, published in 1837.  She deserves to be much better known for her
methodological treatise: How to Observe Morals and Manners (Martineau 1838), a seminal
work that predates and is in many ways superior to Émile Durkheim’s (1895) Rules of
Sociological Method (Hill 1989a; Lengermann and Niebrugge 2001).  And, although Alexis
de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America is often touted as a great “classic,” Martineau’s
methods in Society in America are far more sophisticated (Hill 2001a).
Martineau became the talk of England by writing a twenty-five part presentation of
the then current theories of political economy, appropriately titled: The Illustrations of
Political Economy, published at the rate of one volume a month for two years, 1832-1834.  In
each volume, Martineau conducts a variety of “thought experiment,” by showing how some
specific economic principle would work out in a given setting, describing the setting in as
realistic terms as space allowed.  The problem, of course, is that in real life single economic
principles do not work in a vacuum, they work in combination and in conjunction with many
other social forces.  Nonetheless, Martineau gave it a good try.  She wrote (Martineau 1832-34,
I: x-xi):
. . . if we want to teach that security of property is necessary to the
prosperity of a people, and to show how and in what proportion wealth
increases where there is that security, and dwindles away where there is not,
we may make the fact and the reasons very well understood by stating them
in a dry, plain way: but the same thing will be quite as evident, and far more
interesting and better remembered, if we confirm our doctrine by accounts
of the hardships suffered by individuals, and the injuries by society, in such
a country as Turkey, which remains in a state of barbarism chiefly through
the insecurity of property.  The story of a merchant in Turkey, in contrast
with one of an English merchant, will convey as much truth as any set of
propositions on the subject, and will impress the memory and engage the
interest in a much greater degree.  This method of teaching Political
Economy has never yet been tried, except in the instances of a short story or
separate passage here and there.
This is the method in which we propose to convey the leading
truths of Political Economy, as soundly, as systematically, as clearly and
faithfully, as the utmost pains-taking and the strongest attachment to the
subject will enable us to do.
For Martineau her mental conjectures of the working out of economic principles in real life
were to be not only sound, systematic, and faithful to logic, but also doubly experimental, in
that writing theory in the form of fiction as an instructional device had not yet been tried to any
great extent.  As to the success of this endeavor, I can tell you happily that the English public
waited impatiently for each new monthly installment in Martineau’s series.  It was a smash
hit—boffo!  And whether or not we agree today with Martineau’s version of economics, as a
5 Martineau, it should be noted, also carried out several practical and successful social
experiments in real life, including: miniature farming, lectures for working people, and a
scheme to build better housing for laborers.  For details, see Hill 2005b and Martineau 2004.
6  Going beyond thought to action,  E. Franklin Frazier engaged in risky, real-life “breaching
experiments” during the 1923 meeting of the American Sociological Society (Deegan 2002).
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model for communicating sociological ideas and concepts to the general public, Martineau has
much to teach—and we are all well advised to attend carefully to her.5
W.E.B. DuBois — Crossing the Color Line in the American South  (1988)
William Edward Burghardt DuBois (1868-1963) was the foremost African-American
sociologist of the twentieth century (Deegan 1997a; Hill 1996a).   He should be better-known
for his major study, The Philadelphia Negro (published in 1899) with its detailed ecological
mapping.  In concert with teaching, DuBois was an activist sociologist, and for years he edited
the Crisis, the official voice of the NAACP. 
In the following thought experiment, published in 1904 in the International Journal
of Ethics, DuBois creatively finds a way to bring a white person into a setting where he or she
could not enter in reality:  DuBois writes (1904: 297-8):
Let me take you journeying across the mountains and meadows,
threading the hills of Maryland, gliding over the broad fields of Virginia,
climbing the blue ridge of Carolina and seating ourselves in the cotton
kingdom.  I would not like you to spend a day or a month here in this little
town; I should much rather you would spend ten years, if you are really
studying the problem; for casual visitors get casual ideas, and the problems
here are the growth of centuries.
From the depot and the cluster of doubtful houses that form the
town, pale crimson fields with tell-tale gullies stretch desolately away . . . .
The whole horizon looks shabby . . . .  But I do not want you to see so much
of the physical as of the spiritual town, and first you must see the color line.
It stands at the depot with “waiting room for white people” and “waiting
room for colored people,” and then the uninitiated might lose sight of it; but
it is there, there and curiously wandering, but continuous and never ending.
And in the little town, as in a thousand others, they have an eleventh
commandment, and it reads “Thou shalt not Cross the Line . . . .”
Were you there in person I could not take you easily across the line
into the world I want to study.  But in spirit let me lead you across . . . .
And so he does.  DuBois, using the framework of a thought experiment, helps those on the
other side of the color line explore and better understand a world they cannot easily enter in
real life.6
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Jane Addams — If Men Were Seeking the Franchise (1913)
Jane Addams (1860-1935) is also one of the foremost sociologists of the twentieth
century, a winner of the Nobel Prize for Peace, and – with W.E.B. Dubois – one of the few
sociologists ever honored on a U.S. postage stamp. Addams’ early sociological efforts
culminated in the pioneering Hull-House Maps and Papers in 1895 (Residents of Hull-House
1895).  Its detailed ecological maps of a Chicago neighborhood strongly influenced the
subsequent work of W.E.B. DuBois in Philadelphia (Deegan 1988b) and presaged the so-called
“Chicago school” of ecological sociology by two and a half decades (Deegan 1988a: 55-70).
Addams engaged the community in which she lived, and she worked passionately for
unpopular causes, including pacifism in time of war (Deegan 2003) and the right for women
to vote. 
In a delightfully satirical essay published in the Ladies Home Journal in 1913,
Addams used a thought experiment to turn the tables on men who denied women the right to
vote.  What, she asked, would women do if women could vote but men could not.  Would
women allow men to vote?  Addams (1913: 107-108) wrote:
Let us imagine throughout this article, if we can sustain an absurd
hypothesis for so long, the result upon society if the matriarchal period had
held its own; if the development of the State had closely followed that of the
Family until the chief care of the former, as that of the latter, had come to be
the nurture and education of children and the protection of the weak, sick
and aged . . . . [L]et us assume that the political machinery of such a society,
the franchise and the rest of it, were in the hands of women because they had
always best exercised those functions.  Let us further imagine a given
moment when these women, who in this hypothetical society had possessed
political power from the very beginnings of the State, were being appealed
to by the voteless men that men might be associated with women in the
responsibilities of citizenship . . . .
[L]et us consider various replies which these citizen women might
reasonably make to the men who were seeking the franchise; the men
insisting that only through the use of the ballot could they share the duties
of the State . . . .
In the remainder of the essay Addams skillfully puts in question the patterns of greed and
violence evidenced in the real behavior of many men in positions of power, outlining no less
than six major reasons why men should not be entrusted with the ballot.  But Addams was
neither a sexist nor an essentialist, and concluded:
I do not believe that women broadened by life and its manifold
experiences would actually present these six objections to men as real
reasons for withholding the franchise from them, unless indeed they had
long formed the habit of regarding men not as comrades and fellow-citizens,
but as a class by themselves, in essential matters really inferior although
always held sentimentally very much above them.  (Addams 1913: 112).
11
How ought we to think and act responsibly in a world that is structurally opposite to the present
arrangement?  That is the interesting and insightful question which Addams posed, and one that
we can usefully set again and again in situations of dramatic social inequity.  
Charlotte Perkins Gilman — The Herland/Ourland Saga (1915/16)
Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1860-1935) was another major American sociologist who,
like Addams, with whom she was friends, exerted her primary influence outside the academy.
Gilman is best known in the social sciences for her landmark volume, Women and Economics
(1898), but she clearly deserves to be known for many other works.  During 1909 to 1916,
Gilman published an experimental sociological magazine, The Forerunner, for which she
wrote all the copy for each monthly issue.  In addition to short articles, and even some poetry,
each year she published two or more full-fledged books in serial form, including the well-
known book, Herland.
Herland (1915) was the first half of a two-part saga, concluded in 1916 as With Her
in Ourland, and I am pleased to have collaborated with Mary Jo Deegan in co-editing a timely
new edition of With Her in Ourland (Gilman 1916/1997).  The saga tells how a male
sociologist (Van) stumbles into a woman-only society (Herland), falls in love with a Herland
forester (Ellador), marries, and goes on a tour of “the real world” (i.e., Ourland), only to
conclude that Ourland is, at present (i.e.,1916, during WWI) in much too terrible a state of
affairs to raise a child in (and thus Ellador and Van return to Herland, hoping, however, that
someday Ourland can become a fit place for men, women, and children to live together in
peace and harmony).  This is a complex and lengthy sociological thought experiment (Deegan
1997b; Hill 1996a).  What would a world be like if governed solely by women’s values?  What
would a woman raised in such a world think about the realities of Ourland?  Could a man from
Ourland come to love and understand a woman from Herland?  Should a Herland woman and
an Ourland man have children?  If so, where should they live and raise their child?  If in
Herland, what are the potential consequences of introducing men permanently into Herland’s
previously women-only social structure? 
Gilman’s answers to these conjectures are found in this narrative passage, near the end
of the book.  Van, the sociologist, speaks to the reader:
We settled back into the smooth-running Herland life without a
ripple.  No trouble about housing; they had always a certain percentage of
vacancies, to allow for freedom of movement.  No trouble about clothes;
those perfect garments were to be had everywhere, always lovely and
suitable.  No trouble about food; that smooth, well-adjusted food supply was
available wherever we went.
No appeals for deserving charity—no need of them.  Nothing to
annoy and depress, everything to give comfort and strength; and under all,
more perceptible to me now than before, that vast, steady, onmoving current
of definite purpose, planning and working to make good better and better
best.
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The “atmosphere” in the world behind us [i.e. Ourland]  is that of
a thousand mixed currents, pushing and pulling in every direction,
controverting and opposing one another.
Here [in Herland] was peace—and power, with accomplishment.
Eagerly she [Ellador] returned to her people.  With passionate
enthusiasm she poured out, in wide tours of lecturing, and in print, her report
of world conditions.  She saw it taken up, studied, discussed by those great-
minded over-mothers of the land.  She saw the young women, earnest eyed,
of boundless hope and high purpose, planning, as eager missionaries plan,
what they could do to spread to all the world their proven gains.  Reprints
of that encyclopedia were scattered to every corner of the land, and read
swiftly, eagerly, to crowding groups of listeners.  There began to stir in
Herland a new spirit, pushing, seeking, a new sense of responsibility, a
larger duty.
“It is not enough,” they said, “that we should be so happy.  Here is
the whole round world—millions and hundreds of millions of people—and
all their babies! Not in a thousand years will we rest, till the world is
happy!”
And to this end they began to plan, slowly, wisely, calmly, making
no haste; sure, above all, that they must preserve their own integrity and
peace if they were to help others (Gilman 1916: 192-193) .
Charlotte Perkins Gilman employed an intricate thought experiment to explore the world
during World War I.  Nebraska’s Mari Sandoz, another novelist, brings us up to the eve of
World War II.
Mari Sandoz — Fascism on the Great Plains (1939)
Mari Sandoz (1896-1966) is best known as a novelist of the American west (Stauffer
1982), but she was also a sociology student at the University of Nebraska where, as an
undergraduate, she took what she called a “provocative” course with Professor J.O. Hertzler.
As a result of Hertzler’s course, Sandoz conducted one of the earliest participant observation
studies on record, an investigation of young men who picked up women “at the curb” on the
streets of Lincoln, Nebraska, in 1930 during the Depression (Sandoz 1988).  Sandoz posed as
a young woman willing to be “picked up,” and after attracting the notice of young men, she
promptly interviewed them.  Often pegged as an historian who wrote novels, Sandoz
considered several of her works to comprise a large, interconnected sociological series (Hill
1987, 1989b).
Her most ambitious project along sociological lines is Capital City, published in 1939.
Here, Sandoz conducted an excruciating thought experiment, asking what if Midwesterners
unthinkingly and unwittingly took a right-wing turn of mind?–was fascism possible in
America?
To explore this question, Sandoz draws her characters in Capital City as ideal types,
such that the city itself becomes the protagonist, which may explain the failure of the book in
the eyes of literary critics, and its success from a sociological point of view.  Sandoz took
7 Sandoz’ research memos have been archivally preserved. For a note on the general
methodology of archival research in the history of sociology, per se, see Hill (1993). 
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enormous steps to insure the socio-structural accuracy of her characters and situations, and the
archival record demonstrates that she immersed herself in research just as demanding and
meticulous as if she were writing a non-fiction analysis of urban society in the Midwest.7  The
reality of her fictional creation was to her palpable.  She wrote to her publisher:
The book promises to be pretty good, and certainly unlike anything
that I’ve ever seen.  It has grown so convincing to me I can hardly believe
that it isn’t the story of a real community . . . . (Sandoz to Weeks, 24 April
1939, Box 6, Mari Sandoz Collection, University of Nebraska Archives).
But, could Nebraskans be lulled into fascism?  Sandoz provides her answer in the final chapter.
She wrote:
Then the [fascist] Gold Shirts charged the pickets, the trucks roared
and started to move.  As the Hammond watchman unlocked the big chain
inside the fence, a woman came fighting through the crowd, waving,
shouting to the man.  “Wait! Wait!” she cried, running directly into two
Gold Shirts stomping down men with their boot heels, swinging the butts of
their rifles upon them. (Sandoz 1939: 341-342).
Yes, Nebraskans could become fascists, if they weren’t careful, if they became complacent, if
they didn’t pay attention to power and politics.
Sandoz intended her thought experiment as a “wake-up call,” but when Nebraskans
read her book they turned angrily on the messenger—Sandoz received threats against her life
and she wisely left town, eventually settling in New York.  It took a full decade for the storm
to pass, but in 1950 Sandoz was awarded an honorary doctorate from the University of
Nebraska in recognition of her substantial contributions to American literature (Stauffer 1982:
181).  Working outside the academy, Sandoz applied her sociological acumen as a self-
supporting professional writer and novelist, but not without risk or consequences.  The public
reaction to Sandoz’ “thought experiment” underscores the point that sociology, when it is
accessible rather than esoteric, has the power to move people—sometimes in unpredictable and
unanticipated ways.
LESSONS LEARNED — THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS AND ALTERNATIVE
DISCIPLINARY FUTURES
We have now briefly surveyed five exemplars of sociological thought experiments
from the early years of sociology.  Martineau, DuBois, Addams, Gilman, and Sandoz skillfully
employed  creative hypotheses and logical conjectures to convey sociological understanding
to their readers in new, effective, and dramatic ways.  These instrumental and insightful writers
demonstrate that sociological communication outside the confines of academe is not only
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possible but can also be popular, rewarding, and influential.  But, beyond knowing about
thought experiments, and realizing that thought experiments were successfully utilized by
several early sociologists, do these sociologists have anything else to tell us?
In the years since Mary Jo Deegan’s pioneering work on Jane Addams, we have
learned that there are many such interesting and little-known sociologists peppering the history
of sociology, and that we can know about their ideas only if we take the time to read more
widely and examine our disciplinary record more carefully and critically.  As a result of such
research, Joe R. Feagin (2001), in his presidential address to the American Sociological
Association called on all of us to pay special attention to Harriet Martineau, Jane Addams, and
W.E.B. DuBois, in particular.  These sociologists, Feagin observed, are typically superior to
the traditional academic sociologists emphasized in most sociology courses and reading lists.
Feagin, Deegan and many others are now asking: What does our disciplinary past tell
us about our present? What models from the past are worthy patterns for our future?  What, in
short, are our alternative futures as a discipline?  Although we have long used the concept of
change and planning for the future, the idea of specifically constructing alternative
futures—and then deciding which one we would most prefer, and figuring out how to make it
happen—was coined by British sociologist, Anthony Giddens (1986).
Thus, I have asked, as a thought experiment: What if sociology tomorrow were
founded on the principles of observation and  action advocated by Harriet Martineau?   I
addressed this question in a recent book, co-edited with Susan Hoecker-Drysdale, and here is
my projection (Hill 2001b).  A distinctly Martineauian sociology would have the following
characteristics:
– It would insist on logically ordered and carefully reasoned expositions of social processes
and situations—and avoid simplistic, ad hoc formulas.
– It would feature a fundamental quest for systematic understanding of social institutions as
larger wholes rather than constantly focusing on minute and often irrelevant
questions.
– Direct empirical observation would be respected, as would in-depth qualitative investigations
of social patterns, in contrast to today’s near total reliance on survey questionnaire
data.
– Discourse would be used for corroboration, never as a primary source of empirical evidence.
– Applied demographic, economic, environmental and epidemiological research would be
more highly valued, as would the careful, systematic review and analysis of
government reports and census materials.
– We would demand integrity, egalitarianism, and high moral standards in personal and
professional conduct.
– Further, we would embrace rather than eschew sociological research into social questions in
which we have a profound personal interest.
– We would be sensitive to ethnocentrism and its consequences.
– Recognition for the importance of conducting inclusive investigations across divisive social
attributes, including gender, class, race, physical disability, and the like, together with
active concern for oppressed peoples.
– Concern to better understand the patterns of everyday life and routine experiences.
8 The larger implications of metatheoretical assumptions are outlined in Hill (1977, 1981,
1984, and 2005a).
9 The exciting and enormously interesting work of recovering unsung sociologists has resulted
in an increasingly large number of publications since the 1980s, the bibliographic details of
which lie beyond the scope of the present paper.  Readers interested in this bourgeoning
(continued...)
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– Heightened sensitivity to the impact of metatheoretical assumptions on our inferences and
research designs.8
– We would reconstruct sociology to be a socially purposeful activity intended to be useful
beyond the idyllic groves of academe.
– Dedication to a strong personal work ethic.
– We would  respond as a discipline to local as well as national social and political issues.
– We would disseminate sociological insights and findings to the lay public in comprehensive
formats, including essays, editorials, didactic fiction, and newspaper columns.
– Sociological reflexivity, together with individual reflection on the self and its circumstances,
capabilities, constrains, and opportunities.
– An abiding faith in the possibilities for human social improvement.
– We would mutually encourage our ever increasing capacity for personal growth and
intellectual insight.
– And last, we would all exhibit independence of thought, and steadfast public commitment
and private sacrifice, when conscience dictates—and thereby necessitates—support
for unpopular ideas and perspectives.
By taking Martineau seriously, and conducting a thought experiment based on her ideas, we
can project an alternative future sociology that differs greatly from sociology as it is practiced
today. Is it a future we want to adopt?  Is it workable?   I think so, but that discussion would
likely take us well into the late evening.  
CONCLUSION
For now, suffice it for me to leave you with a general conclusion and a
recommendation: On the evidence, we can conclude that the history of sociology provides
many alternative models of sociological methods and examples of professional activity,
including “thought experiments” and meaningful sociological work outside the ivory tower.
Given this conclusion, let each of us make a commitment to search out models that inspire and
amaze us, to look actively for models that provide constructive alternative futures for our
discipline.
When we look to the past, we need not ask if the past could be different, but we can
and should ask . . . . What if long-ignored lessons from the past were put into play again.  What
if we build a new sociology based on the ideas and practices of Martineau, DuBois, Addams,
Gilman, Sandoz and dozens of other humane, intelligent, and worthwhile sociologists who have
been too long forgotten?9  What if we all conduct a “thought experiment” in which we envision
9(...continued)
research can begin profitably with the books and articles published by Kay Broschart, Mary
Jo Deegan, Michael R. Hill, Susan Hoecker-Drysdale, Patricia Madoo Lengerman, Lynn
MacDonald, Jill Niebrugge-Brantley, Shulamit Reinharz, and Linda Rynbrandt, among others.
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a sociology that is more interesting and exciting, more useful and purposeful, and more
meaningful and understandable?
Let’s keep an eye on the rear view mirror.  Let us learn from our collective past when
it makes sense to do so.  Let us all examine our disciplinary history more closely, carefully, and
critically—and then let us all look to our collective future and seriously ask, What if . . . . ?
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